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Nonacquiescence is the practice of some administrative agencies of
neglecting to appeal, but refusing to follow, federal district and circuit court
decisions that interpret the agency's authorization statute inconsistently with
an agency interpretation of the statute.' Agency nonacquiescence may be
intercircuit or intracircuit in nature.2 Intercircuit nonacquiescence, or "reli-
tigation," is agency disregard for the authoritative influence of a circuit
court's ruling on a point of law when the agency is deciding an identical
point of law in a similar factual situation within another circuit.' Intracircuit
nonacquiescence involves an agency's limitation of a court's ruling or inter-
pretation to the parties before the court and subsequent refusal to apply the
1. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1984) (Secretary of Health
and Human Services (Secretary) disagreed with Ninth Circuit's holdings and announced that
agency did not acquiesce in and would not follow holdings), vacated as moot, 53 U.S.L.W.
3435 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1984); Fincke v. Heckler, 596 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D. Nev. 1984) (Secretary
disagreed with Ninth Circuit's holding and issued nonacquiescence order that all administrative
law judges should follow Social Security Administration (SSA) policy and disobey Circuit's
standard for termination of disability benefits); see also Taxation With Representation Fund v.
Internal Revenue Serv., 646 F.2d 666, 672-73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
acts on basis of legal memorandum supplied by attorneys in Tax Litigation Division in
determining whether to follow rule that federal court decision supplies); NLRB v. Eastern
Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 669, 671 (Ist Cir. 1979) (NLRB's consistent disregard of
First Circuit case law resulted in First Circuit's hearing within one week four cases involving
single principle over which court and NLRB had disagreed for more than ten years); Snyder v.
United States, 582 F. Supp. 196, 199 (D. Md. 1984) (nonacquiescence means that IRS will not
follow decisions of Tax Court in disposing of similar cases); SSR 82-10c (1982) (stating Social
Security Administration's nonacquiescence to Ninth Circuit's interpretation of disability benefits
provisions of Social Security Act); Mattson, The United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB:
Stare Decisis Only Applies If the Agency Wins, 53 OKLA. B.J. 2561, 2561 (1982) (NLRB has
utilized policy called "doctrine of nonacquiescence" to justify disregarding circuit courts'
established rules of law with which Board disagrees); Note, The Commissioner's Nonacquiesc-
ence, 40 S. CAL. L. RE. 550, 550 (1967) (Commissioner of IRS has acted under his interpretation
of revenue laws despite decisions of courts of appeals against that interpretation). See generally
Ferguson, The NLRB vs. the Courts: The Board's Refusal to Acquiesce in the Law of the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 35 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 195, 195-203 (1983) (stating
NLRB's belief that agency can acquiesce or not acquiesce in rule of law that circuit court
articulates and providing examples of NLRB's practice).
2. See Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983) (distinguishing policy
of Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) of refusing to follow Ninth Circuit's
decisions within circuit from agencies' policies of refusing to follow circuit court's decisions
within other circuits).
3. See Goodman's Furniture v. United States, 561 F.2d 462, 465 (3d Cir. 1977) (Weis,
J., concurring) (federal government will continue to litigate in other circuits question that only
one circuit has resolved); id. (ordinary effect of agency nonacquiescence is that agency adheres
to court ruling in circuit of origin but disregards ruling in other circuits); see also Vestal,
Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55
N.C.L. Rav. 123, 123 (1977) (all federal agencies engage in relitigation).
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ruling as binding precedent in factually similar cases arising within the same
circuit. 4 Often federal agencies will continue to follow a judicially rejected
agency position within the court of decision's circuit while presenting the
position to other courts in an attempt to justify use of the position or simply
to create conflict among the circuitsA Most agency nonacquiescence, there-
fore, contains intercircuit as well as intracircuit characteristics. 6 In general,
then, nonacquiescence is essentially agency refusal to acknowledge the general
precedent the judiciary has established.7
An agency may announce or internally develop a policy of nonacquiesc-
ence in many ways.8 A statement of nonacquiescence may appear in an
agency case opinion, 9 ruling, 0 memorandum," or formal policy state-
4. See Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (D. Minn.) (Secretary follows court's
ruling regarding individual claimant whose case was before court but ignores general precedential
effect of ruling), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot in part and remanded, 751
F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Mattson, supra note 1, at 2561 (NLRB employs policy of
nonacquiescence even within circuit court that has repeatedly settled point of law).
5. See Kitchen Fresh, Inc.v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 351, 357, 358 (6th Cir. 1983) (five circuits
condemned NLRB practice and yet NLRB continued to adhere to practice in all circuits); Vestal,
supra note 3, at 123, 126 (as matter of general policy many agencies will continue to adhere to
position courts have rejected and present same position to other courts). Compare May Dep't
Stores Co. v. Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1977) (tremendous burden and costs
that government relitigation strategy of forum shopping places on federal courts grossly outweigh
benefits of strategy) and Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir.
1980) (NLRB owes deference to other courts of appeals that have ruled on issue before agency)
with United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (agency's
attempt to seek conflict in circuits on point of law is acceptable course of action in view of
Supreme Court policy of granting writs of certiorari to resolve circuit conflicts).
6. See H.R. RaP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976) (SSA does not follow court
of appeals decisions with which agency disagrees, either nationwide or within circuit rendering
decision); Vestal, supra note 3, at 126 (in two instances, NLRB relitigated question of law until
five circuits had rejected NLRB position and yet agency still persisted in adhering to position
in all circuits).
7. See Hill v. Heckler, 592 F. Supp. 1198, 1210 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (agency nonacquiesced
by issuing formal ruling instructing agency personnel not to consider court's ruling as binding
precedent); H.R. REP. No. 466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984) (SSA follows all final judgments
of federal courts with respect to individuals in particular suits but does not consider policy
approach embodied in courts' decisions binding on agency with respect to nonlitigants).
8. See Taxation With Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Serv., 646 F.2d 666, 672-
73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (detailing internal IRS nonacquiescence procedures and development);
Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 n.5 (D. Minn.) (agency nonacquiescence policy
can exist even without formal declaration), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), vacated in part as
moot and remanded, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir., 1984); see also J. QuiGoLE & L. REDMAN,
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE § 2.02(c), at 43-44 (1984) (discussing
internal and confidential nonacquiescences as well as formal announcements); Mattson, supra
note 1, at 2563, 2565 (NLRB nonacquiesces by labeling court's remanded compliance order
"law of the case" and offers no guidelines or explanation for limiting court's decision).
9. See Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (SSA's Appeals Council
stated agency's general nonacquiescence policy in Council's findings in case).
10. SSR 82-10c (1982) (SSA's ruling of nonacquiescence to Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of provisions of Social Security Act).
11. H.R. RP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984) (quoting memorandum from
1234 [Vol. 42:1233
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ment.' 2 In some instances an agency may profess to follow the law established
by a circuit court but may employ tacit nonacquiescence by de-emphasizing
that law, by attempting to distinguish the fact patterns in subsequent and
analogous agency cases, or by misapplying the established circuit law to the
facts of subsequent cases. 3 Three important federal agencies, the Social
Security Administration (SSA), as directed by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (Secretary), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), have maintained nonacquiescence
policies. ,4 The three agencies have developed different means of implementing
nonacquiescence, have offered different reasons for utilizing the policy, and
have faced varying degrees of judicial opposition.'5 The propriety of utilizing
nonacquiescence varies with the differing nature of each agency and the
nonacquiescence policy the agency employs.
16
Until October 1984, when Congress passed the Social Security Disability
Benefits Reform Act, the Secretary and the SSA had disagreed openly with
the federal courts of appeal over two issues concerning benefits disbursement
not specifically addressed in the Social Security Act. 7 One of the judicial
Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals issued to Social Security administrative law
judges stating SSA's nonacquiescence policy).
12. Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1980) (NLRB nonacquiescence
expressed in policy statement letter from Regional Director and in footnote in Board case
decision).
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (although
NLRB attempted to distinguish controlling Third Circuit case, court determined that NLRB
actually had adhered to previously rejected agency decision); Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721
F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (NLRB does not profess to disagree with courts of appeals' decisions
on principles of law but instead disingenously misapplies law to facts); Polaski v. Heckler, 585
F. Supp. 997, 1001 (D. Minn.) (SSA administrative law judge gave only lip service to applicable
Eighth Circuit rulings), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), vacated in part as moot and remanded,
751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
14. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (admonishing
NLRB to cease wilful defiance of settled, controlling judicial precedent); Taxation With
Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Serv., 646 F.2d 666, 672-73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (detailing
IRS nonacquiescence policy); SSR 82-49c (1982) (Secretary's nonacquiescence to Ninth Circuit
ruling); SSR 82-10c (1982) (SSA's nonacquiescence in Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Social
Security Act provision); see also Ferguson, supra note 1, at 196-206 (providing definition,
examples, and history of NLRB nonacquiescence); Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings,
Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAxes 768, 771-73 (1965) (detailing history of IRS nonacquiesc-
ence policy regarding Tax Court opinions).
15. See infra notes 17-90 and 100-74 and accompanying text (discussing IRS, NLRB, and
SSA nonacquiescence and judicial reaction to policies).
16. See infra notes 182-200 and accompanying text (discussing varying acceptability of
nonacquiescence practices of IRS, NLRB and SSA).
17. See Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 944 (8th Cir. 1984) (circuit courts and Secretary
have disputed proper construction of Social Security Act with respect to standards for subjective
pain evidence and benefits termination); H.R. REp. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 11 (1984)
(Social Security Act contained no guidelines or criteria for termination of benefits); see also
Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794
(1984).
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interpretations of the Social Security Act in which the Secretary nonac-
quiesced required the SSA to show significant improvement in a claimant's
medical condition before terminating the claimant's disability benefits.' 8 The
second ruling in which the Secretary nonacquiesced required the SSA to give
serious consideration to claimants' subjective complaints of pain when
determining whether claimants were sufficiently medically disabled to receive
disability benefits.' 9
The disagreement over the proper standard for evaluating a claimant's
medical condition originated in 1976 when the SSA abandoned the judicially
accepted "medical improvement" standard and adopted instead a "current
disability" standard. 20 The medical improvement standard required the SSA
to show that a claimant's medical condition actually had improved to the
point of recovery before the SSA could terminate the claimant's benefits.
2 '
Some courts have referred to the medical improvement standard as the
"presumption of continuing disability" standard. 2  The Secretary first pub-
lished the current disability standard in August 1980 by promulgating regu-
lations interpreting the Social Security Act as not requiring that medical
improvement occur in a claimant's disability before termination of benefits.
2
1
The current disability standard allows the Secretary to terminate benefits
when evidence shows that the claimant is able to engage in gainful activity.
2 4
18. See Fincke v. Heckler, 596 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D. Nev. 1984) (Secretary ordered
administrative law judges to disregard two Ninth Circuit rulings and instead follow overruled
SSA benefits termination standards); see also Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340, 1345 (9th
Cir. 1981) (Secretary may not terminate benefits unless SSA shows medical improvement such
that claimant is no longer continuously disabled).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984) (Secretary has refused to
apply standard for evaluation of subjective complaints of pain as enunciated by several circuit
courts); see also Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 997, 1001 & n.1 (D. Minn.) (listing 19 cases
in which Eighth Circuit ruled that Secretary had to give serious consideration to claimant's
subjective complaints of pain even in absence of corraborating medical evidence), aff'd, 739
F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), vacated in part as moot and remanded, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
20. See Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 470 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (parties stipulated
that since June 1, 1976 Secretary had applied standard of current disability). The legislative
history accompanying Congress' passage of the Social Security Disability Insurance program in
1956 provided little indication of congressional intent regarding the proper standard for
terminating an individual's disability benefits. Id. at 469.
21. Id. at 469
22. Id. at 472-73 (courts have imposed standard labeled either "medical improvement
standard" or "presumption of continuing disability" and both standards are substantively
identical); see Dotson v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1983) (agreeing with Ninth Circuit
that SSA's initial determination of plaintiff's disability gave rise to presumption that plaintiff
was still disabled and Secretary was required to rebut presumption); Edwards v. Secretary of
Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 572 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (presumption
of continuing disability is consistent with statutory scheme of Social Security Act).
23. See Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 470 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (in August 1980,
Secretary formally promulgated regulations interpreting Social Security Act as not requiring
that claimant's medical disability improve before termination of benefits); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1594, 416.994(e) (1984) (expressing current disability standard).
24. See SSR 81-6 (Jan. 1981) (outlining disability standard); 45 Fed. Reg. 55,583 (1980)
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In opposition to the SSA's current disability standard, the Ninth Circuit,
in a 1981 decision, adopted the medical improvement standard for determin-
ing the propriety of benefits termination. 2 In January 1982, the Secretary
issued a Social Security Ruling of nonacquiescence in the Ninth Circuit's
decision, directing administrative law judges to continue to follow the current
disability standard as codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. 26 The
Ninth Circuit in February 1982 again overruled an SSA benefit termination
decision and reaffirmed the position that the Secretary should use the court's
medical improvement standard. 27 The Secretary again issued a nonacquiesc-
ence ruling. 2 Later in February, the Associate Commissioner of the SSA's
Office of Hearings and Appeals sent a memorandum to all administrative
law judges, reminding the judges of the Secretary's nonacquiescence directive
and the binding effect of the directive. 29 The Associate Commissioner's
memorandum stated that administrative law judges must apply the SSA's
policy even in cases involving claimants residing within the jurisdiction of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.30
The Secretary's continuing refusal to follow Ninth Circuit precedent
induced individuals whose benefits were terminated under the SSA's standard
to file a class action and seek a preliminary injunction in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California.', In Lopez v. Heckler,12
the plaintiff class challenged the constitutionality of the Secretary's intracir-
(Secretary stating that recodified disability regulations meant disability ends when current
evidence shows that an individual is able to engage in gainful activity); 45 Fed. Reg. 55,568
(1980) (new regulations embody 1976 SSA abandonment of medical improvement standard in
favor of findings of lack of disability based on new evidence). When evidence obtained at the
time of continuing disability investigation establishes that a claimant is not currently disabled,
a cessation of disability support is appropriate irrespective of whether or how much the
claimant's condition has medically improved since a prior favorable determination. SSR 81-6
(Jan. 1981).
25. See Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (Secretary may not
terminate benefits unless SSA shows medical improvement such that claimant is no longer
continuously disabled).
26. SSR 82-10c (1982); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(e) (1984) (expressing current disability
standard).
27. See Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1982) (Secretary has burden of
presenting evidence that claimant's medical condition has improved).
28. SSR 82-49c (1982).
29. See Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 824 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting portions of Hays
memorandum to administrative law judges); H.R. REp. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984)
(quoting portion of memorandum to administrative law judges).
30. See Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 824 (3d. Cir. 1983) (quoting portion of Hays
memorandum).
31. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (C.D. Cal.) (Social Security claimants
filed class action challenging Secretary's use of nonacquiescence policy), stay denied, 713 F.2d
1432 (9th Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), emergency
application to vacate stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983), modified, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.),
vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984).
32. Id.
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cuit nonacquiescence policy on the grounds that the policy violated consti-
tutional principles of separation of powers and due process and the
jurisprudential principle of stare decisis.33 The California district court
granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from implementing
the nonacquiescence policy.
34
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently
denied the Secretary's request for a stay of the Lopez injunction. 35 The Ninth
Circuit noted that the district court had emphasized the negative due process
and equal protection implications of the Secretary's policy and favorably
quoted from the district court's opinion.36 The Ninth Circuit in Lopez stated
that even if the Secretary's policy did not violate the Constitution, the courts
would reject the policy summarily whenever challenged in the Ninth Circuit .
3
After the Supreme Court granted the Secretary's request for a partial stay
of the injunction,3" the Ninth Circuit again considered the constitutionality
of the Secretary's nonacquiescence policy. 39 The Lopez court acknowledged
that the federal judicial interpretation of the Constitution is the supreme law
of the land and is binding on state officers. 40 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the federal courts' interpretation of federal statutory law also binds
federal executive officers.4' The Lopez court, therefore, concluded that the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Social Security Act was binding on the
Secretary.42 Eventually ten circuits adopted the medical improvement or
presumption of continuing disability standard, yet the Secretary continued
to nonacquiesce in all ten circuits. 43
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), emergency application to vacate stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983),
modified, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984).
36. Id. at 1439-40 (quoting Lopez district court's statement that Secretary's nonacquiesc-
ence policy creates dual standard by subjecting poorer claimants to agency nonacquiescence
position while claimants with more resources could reach courts and benefit from more favorable
judicial position).
37. Id. at 1438.
38. Lopez v. Heckler, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), emergency application
to vacate stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983).
39. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 & n.5 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435
(1984).
40. Id. at 1497 n.5; see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (Supreme Court's
construction of fourteenth amendment is supreme law of land and is binding on all state
government officials); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (judiciary
has special duty to interpret federal law).
41. Lopez, 725 F.2d at 1497 n.5; see U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2 (laws made pursuant to
Constitution are supreme law of land); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (President shall take care to see
that laws are faithfully executed).
42. See Lopez, 725 F.2d at 1503 (as member of executive branch, Secretary is required to
apply federal courts' interpretation of federal law).
43. See Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 472 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (ten circuit courts
have held that Secretary may not terminate claimants' disability benefits without showing that
1238 [Vol. 42:1233
AGENCY NONA CQUIESCENCE
A second issue concerning benefits disbursement over which several
circuits and the SSA came to disagree involved the proper standard to apply
in analyzing a claimant's subjective complaints of disabling pain." In a series
of nineteen cases dating back to 1974, the Eighth Circuit established that the
Secretary was required to give serious consideration to claimants' subjective
complaints of pain even when no objective medical evidence existed to
corroborate the complaints. 45 The Secretary's nonacquiescence in the Eighth
Circuit's pain standard was less open than the nonacquiescence to the Ninth
Circuit's benefit termination standard." In Polaski v. Heckler,47 the Secretary
contended to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
that the SSA was following Eighth Circuit law. 4 In granting the plaintiff
class' motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court found that a
systemwide policy of ignoring Eighth Circuit precedent existed.4 9 Specifically,
the district court cited an SSA regulation and a Social Security Ruling, both
of which required a claimant to present objective medical evidence of a
medical condition that reasonably could be expected to produce the symptoms
of which the claimant complained. 50 The district court concluded that by
requiring the claimant to show a direct cause and effect relationship between
previous determination of disability is no longer valid). But see Hill v. Heckler, 592 F. Supp.
1198, 1212 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (Tenth Circuit never has held expressly that Secretary's standard
of review is illegal nor has Secretary nonacquiesced in Tenth Circuit case as SSA has done in
every other circuit imposing "medical improvement" standard). Many circuits have held that
before finding that a beneficiary under the Social Security Act is no longer disabled, the SSA
must show medical improvement in the beneficiary's condition. H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 24 (1984). The Secretary nonacquiesced in all decisions either formally or by refusing
to apply the courts' rulings as precedent. Id.
44. See Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 944 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting conflict between
circuit courts and Secretary over proper standard for analyzing claimant's subjective complaints
of pain); Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 997, 1008 (D. Minn. 1984) (claimant need not show
direct cause and effect relationship between his condition and level of pain he suffers); see also
Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1067 (3d Cir. 1984) (SSA administrative law judge refused
to apply Third Circuit's subjective pain standard in discounting claimant's complaints of
disabling pain); Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981) (SSA must consider
seriously subjective complaints of pain even where complaints are not fully confirmed by
objective medical evidence). With the exception of the District of Columbia Circuit, every circuit
court has ruled that the SSA must allow claimants to present subjective evidence of pain when
adjudicating claimants' eligibility for disability benefits. H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 24 (1984). In each circuit, the SSA has not applied the court of appeals' pain standard as
precedent. Id.
45. Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 997, 1001 & n.1 (D. Minn. 1984), aff'd, 739 F.2d
1320 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot in part and remanded, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
46. Compare id. at 1008, 1009 (Secretary contended that SSA was following Eighth
Circuit's pain standard) with SSR 82-10c (1982) (SSA specifically nonacquiescing to benefits
termination standard set forth in Ninth Circuit opinion).
47. 585 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot in
part and remanded, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 1008, 1009.
49. Id. at 1008.
50. Id. at 1009-10; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1984) (SSA stating that agency would never
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the disabling condition and the level of pain suffered, the Secretary was
acting contrary to Eighth Circuit law." The Minnesota district court found
that the Secretary need not issue a formal ruling of nonacquiescence for a
practice of nonacquiescence actually to exist.
2
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the Secretary and the plaintiff class
reached an out-of-court settlement regarding the proper pain standard after
the court had deferred its decision at the close of oral argument. 3 The
Eighth Circuit adopted the agreement as a correct restatement of the Circuit's
case law because under the agreement claimants did not have to present
direct medical evidence of a cause and effect relationship between the
impairment and the degree of the claimants' subjective complaints.14 The
agreement, however, apparently left unresolved the Secretary's intracircuit
nonacquiescence in the Eighth Circuit's medical improvement standard.53
Perhaps the Secretary's persistent adherence to the rejected current
disability and subjective pain standards has been in response to congressional
pressure to reduce the number of disability claimants receiving benefits. 6 In
enacting the Social Security Disability Act of 1980, 57 Congress expressed
concern about reports that as many as twenty percent of all disability
recipients were not qualified to receive benefits and instructed the Secretary
to conduct periodic reviews of the qualifications of many beneficiaries."
Consequently, in March 1981, the Secretary accelerated the rate of disability
status reviews.59 Coupled with an application of pressure on administrative
find claimant disabled based on pain symptoms unless medical findings demonstrated that
medical condition existed that reasonably could be expected to produce claimant's pain); SSR
82-58 (1982) (claimant must present objective medical basis to support overall evaluation of
impairment severity). In arguing that the Secretary indeed was pursuing an unstated policy of
nonacquiescence, the district court in Polaski v. Heckler noted two recent decisions in which
the Secretary's Appeals Council had instructed the administrative law judge on remand to
follow SSA regulations and rulings rather than the Eighth Circuit pain standard the district
court had mandated. 585 F. Supp. at 1010.
51. Id. at 1008, 1009.
52. Id. at 1011 n.5.
53. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot in part and
remanded, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 1322.
55. Id. at 1321-22.
56. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (postulating congressional pressure to
reduce number of claimants caused SSA nonacquiescence).
57. Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, 460 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 421(h)
(1982)).
58. See Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 471 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (as consequence of
congressional concern that 20% of all supposedly disabled benefits recipients reportedly were
ineligible, Social Security Disability Act of 1980 provided for periodic SSA reviews of many
beneficiaries).
59. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal.) (beginning in March 1981,
SSA accelerated rate at which agency reviewed disability status of those receiving disability
benefits), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice), emergency application to vacate stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983), modified,
725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984).
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law judges to trim the disability rolls6° as part of a SSA cost-cutting
program, 6' the increased review rate resulted in a large increase in termina-
tions. 62 Given the high reversal rate of SSA cases in the federal courts, 63 if
the Secretary had adhered to the courts' less stringent standards for benefits
review, the government would not have saved as much money as it actually
did save through the cessation of benefits payments to so many claimants.
64
The Secretary has offered several justifications for use of nonacquiesc-
ence policies. 65 In a Social Security Ruling of nonacquiescence to the Ninth
Circuit's medical improvement standard, the Secretary suggested that the
court's standard would be impossible for the SSA administer because evi-
dence on the basis of which state agencies originally conferred benefits might
not be available or no longer may exist. 66 The Lopez district court countered
this argument by stating that the agency should proceed in harmony with
the Ninth Circuit rule and could infer an exception to the rule only if the
facts in a particular case so required. 67 The district court noted that the
judiciary has the particular duty to interpret the law and that this province
of the court serves as the cornerstone of the doctrine of separation of
powers. 68 The court stated that governmental agencies, therefore, like all
other individuals and entities, must follow and apply the courts' interpreta-
60. See Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, No. 84-0124 (D.D.C. Sept.
10, 1984) (available Feb. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (administrative law
judges employed by Department of Health and Human Services and assigned to Office of
Hearings and Appeals of SSA brought suit to challenge Secretary's review program and
nonacquiescence policy as coercively restrictive of decisional independence).
61. See Edwards v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 572 F. Supp. 1235,
1238 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (SSA apparently predicated termination of plaintiff claimant's benefits
on Secretary's cost-cutting program).
62. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal.) (acceleration of SSA's review
process resulted in dramatic increase in benefits terminations), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th
Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), emergency application to
vacate stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983), modified, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot,
53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984).
63. See Heaney, Why the High Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases, 7
HAMLiNE L. REv. 1, 8 (1984) (Eighth Circuit reversed about 60% of all disability cases claimants
appealed to court); see also Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 471 (E.D. Ohio 1984) (of
approximately 350,000 disability terminations administrative law judges left undisturbed, federal
courts ordered re-examination of 100,000 cases).
64. See Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D. Minn.) (Secretary adopted
nonacquiescence policies with intention of reducing number of people receiving benefits), aff'd,
739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), vacated in part as moot and remanded, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
65. See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text (SSA support for nonacquiescence
policy).
66. SSR 82-10c (1982).
67. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th
Cir.), partial stay granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), emergency application to
vacate stay denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983), modified, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53
U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984).
68. Id. at 29.
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tion of the law.6 9 Consequently, the Lopez district court reasoned that for
the Secretary to completely refute courts of appeal precedent was to operate
outside the law.7 0 The Secretary also has asserted that only Supreme Court
opinions bind the SSA and that district or circuit court opinions are binding
only in the specific cases decided.71 The federal courts have countered the
Secretary's argument by noting that, although the Secretary has professed to
obey only Supreme Court rulings, the Secretary has refused to appeal many
adverse decisions to the Supreme Court.7 2 Consequently, the courts have
stated that the Secretary is seeking to eliminate the risk of being bound by
an unfavorable decision by depriving the Supreme Court of the opportunity
to issue opinions settling conflicts.
73
In addition to claiming that the SSA was circumventing the proper
appeals process, federal courts have countered the SSA's assertion that only
Supreme Court precedent binds the agency by referring to the doctrine of
separation of powers.7 4 The doctrine of separation of powers acknowledges
that each of the three branches of the federal government retains a sphere
of influence free of undue encroachment from the other branches into
constitutionally mandated functions.7 5 As the Ninth Circuit noted in Lopez,
the judiciary has the exclusive duty to interpret the laws.7 6 One court
specifically stated that interpretation of the Social Security Act is a judicial
function.7 7 The courts have reasoned, therefore, that when the Secretary, a
member of the executive branch, nonacquiesces, the Secretary usurps the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 30.
71. See Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (quoting Secretary's
Appeals Council's findings), aff'd, 715 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983).
72. See Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (D. Minn.) (Secretary will obey only
edicts of Supreme Court, yet refuses to appeal adverse rulings to Court), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1320
(8th Cir.), vacated as moot in part and remanded, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
73. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984) (SSA practice of declining
to appeal to Supreme Court ensures that Court will not have opportunity to review issue and
render binding decision).
74. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 & n.5 (9th Cir.) (Secretary's nonacquiesc-
ence undermines separation of powers precept), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984); Polaski v.
Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Minn. 1984) (by refusing to follow Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of law within circuit Secretary is acting in violation of constittional doctrine of
separation of powers), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot in part and remanded,
751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
75. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (actions
of any of three branches of federal government may not constitute an assumption of constitu-
tional field of action of another branch); United States v. Brainer, 515 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D.
Md. 1981) (executive and legislative branches cannot compromise institutional independence of
judicial branch).
76. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 & n.5 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435
(1984); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (judiciary has special duty
to interpret meaning of federal law).
77. Mayburg v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 922, 929 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Mayburg
v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 740 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1984).
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lawful authority of the judiciary in violation of the separation of powers. 78
The separation of powers principle, the courts assert, precludes the executive
from overruling the judgments not only of the Supreme Court but also of
the circuit and district courts.
7 9
The Secretary further sought to justify the nonacquiescence policy as a
means of ensuring that claimants throughout the country are governed by
uniform laws, rules, and regulations.80 The courts have noted, however, that
implementation of an intracircuit nonacquiescence policy actually leads to
less uniformity, rather than more uniformity, in the application of law by
creating a dual standard governing claimants.8 ' The Lopez district court
noted that those claimants with the financial and physical ability to pursue
appeals through the administrative process to the courts could expect the
courts to apply the more favorable standard of benefits review.82 Conversely,
the SSA would subject poorer claimants, who exhausted their resources and
never reached the courts, to the agency's nonacquiescence policy and termi-
nation of benefits.8
3
In addition to stating a need for uniformity, the Secretary has pointed
to the courts' acceptance of the IRS' nonacquiescence policy as justification
for the nonacquiescence policy of the SSA.Y The Ninth Circuit in Lopez,
however, noted that IRS nonacquiescence rulings are not applicable within
the circuit that rendered the opinion to which the agency nonacquiesced.1
The courts have stated that the material difference between IRS and SSA
nonacquiescence is that IRS nonacquiescence is intercircuit in nature while
the SSA's policy operates on an intracircuit basis.86 The Lopez court recog-
nized that because circuit conflict is inevitable, courts could not always
expect agencies to give nationwide effect to the rulings of a court of appeals.8 7
78. Valdez v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (D. Colo. 1983).
79. Id.
80. Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, No. 84-0124 (D.C.C. Sept. 10, 1984)
(available Feb. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
81. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 30 (C.D. Cal.) (Secretary's policy of
nonacquiescence creates two standards governing claimants whose disability benefits are termi-
nated as result of nonacquiescence), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.), partial stay granted,
104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), emergency application to vacate stay denied, 104 S.
Ct. 221 (1983), modified, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 n.12 (9th Cir.) (in defense of nonacquiesc-
ence policy Secretary pointed out that IRS issues nonacquiescence rulings frequently), vacated,
53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984); Fincke v. Heckler, 596 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Nev. 1984) (Secretary
analogizes IRS nonacquiescence practice to practice of HHS).
85. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 n.12 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435
(1984).
86. See id.; Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983) (Secretary's
argument citing IRS nonacquiescence ignores ordinary effect of agency's nonacquiescence, which
is adherence to court ruling in circuit of origin but disregard for ruling in other circuits).
87. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 n.12 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435
(1984).
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The Lopez court reasoned that instead of supporting the Secretary's nonac-
quiescence policy, the IRS policy recognizes that agencies must follow the
holdings of a court of appeals within that circuit. 8
As the decisions of the Ninth Circuit in Lopez and the Eighth Circuit in
Polaski indicate, judicial reaction to SSA nonacquiescence has been predom-
inantly negative.8 9 Courts critical of the SSA's nonacquiescence policy have
analogized the policy to certain portions of the novels Alice in Wonderland
and Catch-22 and even have compared the policy with the pre-Civil War
doctrine of nullification." Congress, however, has not been as unequivocal
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillian, J.,
concurring specially) (if Secretary persisted in pursuing nonacquiescence policy judge would
seek to bring contempt proceedings against Secretary); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463,
493 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (public interest requires that court condemn Secretary's policy); Valdez
v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (D. Colo. 1983) (if Secretary again refuses to follow
district court order to adhere to Ninth Circuit precedent, court will invoke contempt powers);
see also supra notes 62-83 (judicial counter arguments to Secretary's justifications for nonac-
quiescence). But see Hill v. Heckler, 592 F. Supp. 1198, 1210 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (Circuit courts'
protestations over Secretary's nonacquiescence policy are contrary to will of Congress and
dictates of Supreme Court).
Unlike most federal courts addressing the issue, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma in Hill v. Heckler did not condemn the SSA's nonacquiescence
policy. Id. The Hill district court stated that although circuit after circuit had succumbed to the
unsound reasoning and sympathetic claims of Social Security plaintiffs, the Tenth Circuit had
not committed that error. Id. at 1200-01. The district court decided that the other circuits had
contradicted congressional discretion vested in the SSA and had contravened a specific Supreme
Court ruling when the circuits imposed a medical improvement standard on the SSA. Id. at
1210; see Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336 (1976) (worker bears continuing burden of
showing by medical diagnostic techniques that worker has physical or mental impairment in
order to establish continued entitlement to disability benefits). The Oklahoma district court
decided that the other circuits were accusing the Secretary of unconstitutionally refusing to
acquiesce in the circuits' disobedience toward the Supreme Court and usurpation of legislative
prerogatives and were thereby thwarting the Secretary's attempt to administer the Social Security
Act in the congressionally prescribed uniform, nationwide manner. Hill, 592 F. Supp. at 1211.
The Hill court determined that the origin of the medical improvement standard might have
been merely a judicial description of then-current SSA policy rather than a judicial prescription
for future SSA policy. Id. at 1212. The district court, therefore, refused to grant the claimants'
motion for injunctive relief and instead granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss the plantiff's
claim. Id. at 1214.
90. See Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring)
(Secretary's ill-advised policy of nonacquiescence is similar to repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine
of nullification whereby rebellious states refused to recognize certain federal laws), partial stay
granted, 104 S. Ct. 10 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), emergency application to vacate stay denied,
104 S. Ct. 221 (1983), modified, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984);
Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340, 1344 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (analogizing Secretary's
pronouncements of nonacquiescence to certain statements by Humpty Dumpty in novel Alice
in Wonderland); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 493 n.22 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (comparing




in condemning SSA nonacquiescence as the courts have been. 9' In drafting
the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (Benefits Reform
Act), the two houses of Congress adopted in their reports different views
regarding SSA nonacquiescence. 92 The House of Representatives' version of
the Benefits Reform Act, in keeping with the thrust of the House report,
would have required the Secretary to acquiesce in interpretive circuit court
decisions and follow those decisions as precedent within the circuit of
decision.9 a The Senate's bill, however, merely provided that Congress should
not be understood as sanctioning any decision of the Secretary not to
acquiesce. 94
The Benefits Reform Act, as enacted, adopted the Secretary's standards
for benefits termination and for analyzing claimants' subjective complaints
of pain. 9 The Benefits Reform Act, therefore, rendered the controversy
between the Secretary and the courts moot without specifically addressing
the nonacquiescence dispute. 96 The House-Senate committee of conference,
however, did urge that the Secretary follow a policy of nonacquiescence only
when the SSA has initiated or expects to initiate steps necessary to receive
review in the Supreme Court.97 If Supreme Court review proved unavailable
or impractical, the committee members expected that the Secretary would
propose appropriate remedial legislation for congressional resolution of a
91. See S. REP. No. 466, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1984) (statement of Sen. Long)
(condemning result in cases where courts emphasize their interpretation of Social Security Act
over SSA's statutory construction).
92. Compare H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 25 (1984) (House Committee
on Ways and Means expressing concern over duality SSA's nonacquiescence policy creates and
improper agency confrontations with courts resulting from SSA's refusal to apply circuit courts'
opinions), with S. REP. No. 446, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984) (Senate Committee on Finance
stating that policy of mandatory acquiescence would interfere with long standing congressional
importance attached to national uniformity).
93. See H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1984).
94. See S. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1984).
95. See Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, §§
2(a), 3(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1794, 1794-96, 1799 (1984) (discounting previous determinations of
disability in setting standard of review for benefits termination and requiring claimant to
establish connection between demonstrable medical impairment and subjective complaints of
pain); see also Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 950 (8th Cir. 1984) (intent of Congress was to
write Secretary's pain standard into Benefits Reform Act); Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066,
1069 (3d Cir. 1984) (in enacting Benefits Reform Act Congress affirmed Secretary's stated
position on evaluation of pain). In addition to codifying the Secretary's standards for evaluation
of pain and benefits termination, the Benefits Reform Act requires the courts to remand to the
Secretary the cases of persons whose benefits SSA had terminated. Social Security Disability
Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2(d)(3)-(5), 98 Stat. 1794, 1798 (1984).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1984) (although conference
committee deleted House and Senate nonacquiescence provisions, committee members felt that
statutory clarification adopted in Benefits Reform Act would remove obstacles to resolution by
Secretary and courts of agency's and courts' disagreements over correct statutory interpretation);
see also Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir., 1984) (Benefits Reform Act supports
Secretary's stated pain standard and therefore defeats claimants' nonacquiescence argument).
97. H.R. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1984).
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controverted issue. 9 The committee members noted, however, that ultimate
resolution of the legal and constitutional issues nonacquiescence raises rests
with the Supreme Court.99
As have the Secretary and the SSA, the NLRB has utilized a policy of
nonacquiescence, often within circuits in which the circuit courts repeatedly
have determined a particular point of law.1°0 In addition to intracircuit
nonacquiescence, the NLRB practices intercircuit nonacquiescence, or reliti-
gation.' 0 1 Unlike the SSA, the NLRB rarely has provided explicit statements
of nonacquiescence or a basis for ignoring circuit precedent. 02 The earliest
and most extensive statement of NLRB nonacquiescence occurred in Insur-
ance Agents International Union.03 In Insurance Agents the NLRB stated
that the agency's consistent policy had been to determine whether to acquiesce
in the contrary views of a circuit court or whether to nonacquiesce by
adhering to the agency's rejected position unless or until the Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court's decision.104 The agency trial examiner's duty, the
NLRB continued, is always to apply established Board precedent that the
agency or the Supreme Court has not reversed.105 Utilizing an argument that
the SSA has recently adopted, the NLRB then asserted that only by adhering
to agency precedent could the agency achieve uniform and orderly adminis-
tration of a national act.101
In a case decided four years before Insurance Agents, the Seventh Circuit
criticized the NLRB for refusing to adopt the Seventh Circuit's ruling
upholding an employer's right to lock out employees after bargaining to
impasse. 0 7 At the time the Seventh Circuit decided Morand Brothers Beverage
Co. v. NLRB, the NLRB had not yet developed a nonacquiescence policy
but rather, in Morand, was refusing to follow on remand the Seventh
Circuit's decision. 08 In subsequent cases addressing the NLRB's current
98. Id. at 38.
99. Id.
100. See Mattson, supra note 1, at 2562; see also NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp.,
598 F.2d 666, 669 (lst Cir. 1979) (court still hearing cases involving single principle over which
court and NLRB had disagreed for over ten years).
101. See Vestal, supra note 3, at 126 (in two separate instances five circuit courts eventually
heard and rejected NLRB's position but agency continued to adhere to rejected view); see also
Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (1979) (Board refusing to follow decisions
of Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in case originating in First Circuit).
102. See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 204 (NLRB has not set forth its views on nonacquiesc-
ence or rationale for adhering to doctrine); Mattson, supra note 1, at 2563 (NLRB's rules and
decisions do not provide any agency rule or criteria explaining when, how, or why NLRB will
determine to nonacquiesce).
103. 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see H.R. RP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984) (SSA defends nonac-
quiescence policy on grounds that agency should administer federal benefits program uniformly
on national basis).
107. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1953).
108. Id.
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nonacquiescence policy, however, courts have adopted the Morand court's
reasoning that the position of an administrative tribunal is similar to that of
a district court in that the lower tribunal is bound to follow the law as
interpreted by a court of appeals.1c0
The NLRB implements its current nonacquiescence policy by labeling a
remanded compliance order "law of the case."" 0 This label means that the
NLRB is limiting the court's ruling to the particular litigants involved in the
case before the court."' The NLRB then will ignore the court's ruling and
adhere instead to the agency decision rejected by the court.' 2 In so circum-
scribing a judicial decision to affect only the immediate parties, the NLRB
policy resembles SSA nonacquiescence." 3 Unlike the SSA, however, the
NLRB provides no explanation for the nonacquiescence and publishes no
agency policy statement that would give litigants some indication of when
the litigants could expect the agency to nonacquiesce to a court decision
which is contrary to the agency's stated position." 4 The SSA usually bases
its nonacquiescence policy on adherence to already existing and published
rulings or regulations interpreting the Social Security Act and the agency
,provides at least some explanation for using the policy in each case." 5 The
NLRB, however, proceeds through case by case adjudication and never has
based agency nonacquiescence on a published rule."
6
One recent example of NLRB nonacquiescence occurred in Allegheny
General Hospital v. NLRB."1 In Allegheny, the Third Circuit had rendered
two prior opinions which held that traditional standards for determining
appropriate bargaining units were inapplicable to hospital bargaining units."'
109. Id.; see Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980) (NLRB's
nonacquiescence policy is intolerable because position of administrative tribunal is similar to
that of district court and, like district court, agency must follow law of circuit); Allegheny Gen.
Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (nonacquiescence has no authoritative effect
because agency is bound to adhere to circuit precedent).
110. See Mattson, supra note 1, at 2563 (only notice to parties potentially affected by
NLRB nonacquiescence is agency's labeling remanded court order "law of the case").
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (D. Minn. 1984) (Secretary follows
court's ruling only as to claimant whose case was before court and ignores general precedential
effect of holdings).
114. See Mattson, supra note 1, at 2563, 2565 (NLRB provides no guidelines or explanations
concerning when or why agency decides to nonacquiesce); see also SSR 82-IOc (1982) (SSA
stating that Ninth Circuit's interpretation would be too difficult for agency to administer and
therefore agency would continue to follow standard set forth in regulation).
115. See SSR 82-10c (1982) (SSA will continue to adhere to agency regulation set forth in
20 C.F.R. § 416.994(e)).
116. See Mattson, supra note 1, at 2564, 2565 (NLRB develops law through case by case
adjudication and agency's actions are governed by unpublished rules of law).
117. 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1975).
118. Id. at 966; see St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977)
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The NLRB "respectfully disagreed" with the results in both decisions and
adhered to traditional community-of-interest criteria for making unit deter-
minations in the health care industry. 1 9 The NLRB argued before the Third
Circuit that the court should enforce the agency's order if the agency's legal
theory was reasonably defensible.2 0 The NLRB also requested that the court
reconsider the two previous decisions. 2' Finally, the NLRB contended that
the agency had in fact satisfied the requirements that the Third Circuit had
set forth in one of the court's earlier decisions. 122
The Third Circuit rejected all three agency arguments. 2 The Allegheny
court cited a Supreme Court case which stated that courts have a responsi-
bility to review administrative decisions fully and not merely rubber-stamp
judicial affirmance. 24 In that Supreme Court case, the Court also noted that
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) specifically empowers the courts
to enforce, modify, or set aside NLRB orders.' 25 The Allegheny court
concluded, therefore, that the court need not uphold an NLRB order merely
because the order constituted a reasonably defensible construction of the
NLRA.
126
In addition to deciding that the court should limit the amount of
deference granted the NLRB determination, the Third Circuit recognized
that the agency merely was repeating earlier arguments for the rejected
agency position. 127 In the Third Circuit's view, the NLRB simply was refusing
to apply the law the federal judiciary previously had announced. 12 The
Allegheny court stated that the doctrine of stare decisis and the power of
federal courts to interpret statutes rendered reconsideration of earlier relevant
(legislative history of health care amendments evinces that Congress directed NLRB to apply
nontraditional bargaining unit standard in health care field); Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 545
F.2d 351, 361 (3d Cir. 1976) (in accepting bargaining unit determination of Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board, NLRB neglected to exercise congressionally mandated discretion and therefore
failed to regard congressional admonition against proliferation of units in health care facilities).
119. 608 F.2d at 966-67; see Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 872-73 (1978)
(NLRB disagreeing with Memorial Hospital and St. Vincent's Hospital decisions).
120. 608 F.2d at 967.
121. Id. at 967, 968.
122. Id. at 967.
123. Id. at 967-70.
124. Id. at 967-68; see NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1964) (courts would abdicate
judicial responsibility if they did not review administrative decisions fully).
125. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1964) (Congress expressly authorized courts
to dispose of NLRB orders in whole or in part); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982) (court of
appeals may grant such relief as court determines is proper, and may enforce, modify or set
aside in whole or in part order of NLRB); id. § 160(0 (upon petition of aggrieved party court
may dispose of NLRB order as provided in § 160(e)).
126. 608 F.2d at 968 (court cannot permit deference that court owes expert tribunal to slip





decisions of the court unnecessary. 29 As the Third Circuit noted, under the
common-law doctrine of precedent or stare decisis, specific legal conse-
quences attach to a set of facts in an adjudicated case, which then furnish
the rule for determining subsequent cases involving identical or similar
material facts. 30 The rule applies for cases arising in the same court or in a
lower court in the judicial hierarchy.' 3' The Third Circuit reasoned that a
decision of a court of appeals that the Supreme Court has not overruled is
a decision of the court of last resort. 32 The court of appeals' ruling, therefore,
is binding on all inferior courts and litigants within the circuit as well as on
administrative agencies. 33 Coupled with the Third Circuit's assertion that
the NLRB is not the equal of the court in matters of statutory interpretation,
the court reasoned that the doctrine of stare decisis renders a NLRB
nonacquiescence simply an academic exercise possessing no authoritative
effect. 34 The Third Circuit in Allegheny also noted that Congress had vested
the exclusive and final authority to enforce NLRB orders with the courts of
appeals and not with the agency. 35 The Allegheny court concluded that the
NLRB was operating outside the law in failing to acquiesce to a circuit
court's statutory interpretation because Congress had not given the agency
the express authority to nonacquiesce.
36
In the manner of the Allegheny court, other courts confronted with
NLRB nonacquiescence have provided several reasons why the agency should
not utilize the policy.' 37 Courts facing intercircuit NLRB nonacquiescence
have labeled the policy "circuit shopping" and have suggested that the
practice wastes overtaxed appellate court resources as well as agency re-
129. Id. at 969.
130. Id.; see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1939) (stare decisis represents element
of continuity in law and is rooted in psychological need to satisfy reasonable expectations).




135. Id. The Third Circuit in Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB, in addition to noting
the specific NLRA enforcement authority of the courts, cited Marbury v. Madison for the
general proposition that the judiciary emphatically has the province and duty to say what the
law is. Id.; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
136. 608 F.2d at 970. After dispensing with the NLRB's first two arguments supporting
the agency's nonacquiescence, the Third Circuit in Allegheny refuted the agency's contention
that the NLRB in fact had adhered to the court's previous relevant decision. Id. at 970-71. The
Allegheny court found that in purportedly relyling on a discretionary standard set forth in one
earlier Third Circuit decision, the NLRB had acted in direct conflict with another Third Circuit
decision. Id. at 971.
137. See Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382 n.37 (D.D.C. 1983) (NLRB exceeds
its authority in refusing to apply controlling circuit law to cases that are not materially
distinguishable); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980) (position of
administrative tribunal whose findings and conclusions are subject to direct judicial review is
similar to that of district court and as with a district court, agency is bound to follow law of
circuit).
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sources. 3 The Seventh Circuit has suggested that the NLRB owes deference
to other courts of appeals which have ruled on an issue under the agency's
consideration.13 9
In addition to criticizing the NLRB's intercircuit nonacquiescence, courts
have reproved intracircuit NLRB nonacquiescence. 40 Courts addressing NLRB
nonacquiescence, like courts considering SSA nonacquiescence, have asserted
that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers.' 4' The courts have stated that the doctrine applies equally to the Supreme
Court and inferior federal courts. 42 The courts argue, therefore, that agen-
cies, as members of the executive branch, must respect the province of the
judiciary to interpret the law.
43
In addition to the NLRB and the SSA, the IRS has utilized a policy of
nonacquiescence.' Unlike the SSA and the NLRB, however, the IRS has
developed a practice of indicating both acquiescences and nonacquiescences
in judicial decisions. 45 The origin of the IRS policy is not as ambiguous as
138. NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 1984) (unnecessary and
repetitious litigation by administrative agencies places increasing burden on federal courts, incurs
additional costs for government and citizens, and is appropriate area for congressional scrutiny);
Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 912 n.l (3d Cir. 1981) (agency "circuit shopping"
wastes judicial and agency resources).
139. Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980).
140. See Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that court
could not acquiesce to NLRB's policy of refusing to follow court of appeals precedent where
case will come up for review before same court with which agency disagrees); see also Cerro
Metal Prod. v. Marshall, 467 F. Supp. 869, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Secretary of Labor may
appeal district court judgment if he does not agree with decision, but Secretary of Labor may
not prevail in his insistence that his interpretation is binding on court).
141. See NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 1984) (court refused to
abdicate to NLRB power and authority to conduct judicial review).
142. See Cerro Metal Prod. v. Marshall, 467 F. Supp. 869, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (separation
of powers principles, which preclude Congress or executive from overruling judgments of
Supreme Court, have equal applicability for judgments of lowliest of article III courts).
143. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (since Marbury
v. Madison, judicial department has emphatically had province and duty to say what law is and
NLRB does not have authority to disagree with court decisions).
144. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 75 n.8, 79-80 (1965) (recognizing IRS practice
of publishing acquiescences and nonacquiescences and upholding Commissioner's retroactive
withdrawal of an acquiescence); B. BrrTKER, FEDERAL TAXATiON OF INCOME, EsTATEs, AND
GnrFs 110.5.6, at 50 (1981) (in addition to announcing formal acquiescences and nonacquiesc-
ences to Tax Court decisions, IRS also announces whether agency will accept particular decisions
of federal district and circuit courts as precedents for disposition of similar cases); Note, supra
note 1, at 550 (Commissioner acquiesces and nonacquiesces in decisions of Tax Court, Court
of Claims, and federal district court and court of appeals decisions).
145. See Taxation With Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Serv., 646 F.2d 666, 672-
73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (detailing IRS's policy of acquiescing or nonacquiescing in court opinions);
Note, supra note 1, at 550 (Commissioner states acquiescence or nonacquiescence in federal
court decisions); see also A. SANTA BARBARA, INTERNAL RVEVNuE SERVICE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 94 (1977) (IRS announces Commissioner's decisions whether agency acquiesces or
does not acquiesce in regular Tax Court decision).
1250 [Vol. 42:1233
AGENCY NONA CQUIESCENCE
the sources of SSA or NLRB nonacquiescence.' 46 The present IRS policy of
stating acquiescences and nonacquiescences is to a large extent an historical
accident. 47 The Revenue Act of 1924 provided that the Commissioner of the
IRS (Commissioner) had one year to appeal from an adverse decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals, the forerunner of today's Tax Court. 4 Until the
expiration of the one year appeal period, taxpayers and IRS field agents
could not be certain whether the court's opinion was final and in conformity
with the current IRS policy. 49 To enlighten the field agents and aid taxpayers,
the IRS began to issue acquiescences and nonacquiescences in Board of Tax
Appeals cases shortly after the decision in each case.'5 0 The need for the
acquiescence program decreased when Congress in 1932 changed the appeal
period to three months.'-" The IRS, however, did not abandon the acquies-
cence program because the program served as a guide for prospective
transactions and aided taxpayers in understanding the Commissioner's cur-
rent view of the law.
52
146. Compare Rogovin, supra note 14, at 771-72 (detailing history of IRS acquiescence
program) and J. QtiGGLE & L. REDaN, supra note 8, § 2.02(c), at 44 (briefly noting probable
basis of IRS's announcing acquiescences and nonacquiescences) with Ferguson, supra note 1,
at 203-04 (tracing origins of NLRB nonacquiescence policy is difficult task) and H.R. REP. No.
618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-26 (1984) (discussing SSA's nonacquiescence policy in depth but
not providing history or origin of policy).
147. See Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1975) (present IRS practice
of determining whether to acquiesce is largely result of historical accident).
148. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(b), 43 Stat. 253, 297 (1924) (amended 1926).
149. See J. QuitoLE & L. REDmAN, supra note 8, § 2.02(c), at 44 (in early days of tax law
IRS did not inform field agents of agency policy during pendency of one year period for
appeal); Rogovin, supra note 14, at 771 (taxpayer receiving favorable opinion from Board of
Tax Appeals could not be sure of opinion's finality until one year appeal period had run).
150. See J. QUIGGLE & L. REDMAN, supra note 8, § 2.02(c), at 44 (IRS began practice of
acquiescing and nonacquiescing to enlighten field agents as to current agency policy); Rogovin,
supra note 14, at 771 (IRS began to issue acquiescences and nonacquiescences to aid taxpayers).
151. See Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1975) (purpose for acquies-
cence program was lost when in 1932 Congress reduced time for appeal from decision of Board
of Tax Appeals to three months); Rogovin, supra note 14, at 721 (after 1932, need for
acquiescence procedure as indicator of IRS's appeal plans disappeared).
152. See Rogovin, supra note 14, at 722 (IRS retained acquiescence program as means of
keeping public and agency informed of Commissioner's current litigation position). As courts
and commentators have noted, the IRS does not intend to substitute the acquiescence program
for the agency's ruling or regulation program. Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 621 (7th
Cir. 1975); Rogovin, supra note 14, at 773. Many IRS bulletins have indicated that taxpayers
should exercise caution in relying on the acquiescence program. See 1964 1 C.B. 3 (taxpayers
should exercise caution in applying to similar cases adverse decision acquiesced in unless facts
and circumstances of two cases are substantially identical); see also 1975 STAND. FED. TAx REP.
(CCH) 5980A.018 (Commissioner's nonacquiescences are reliable conclusions of IRS only so
far as they concern application of law to facts in particular case); id. (acquiescence means IRS
accepts conclusion court reached and does not constitute acceptance of any or all reasons court
assigned for ultimate decision). The Supreme Court has decided that the Commissioner has
complete power to modify, amend, or revoke IRS acquiescences and nonacquiescences and to
make such changes retroactive. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 71 & n.2, 72-73 (1965).
1985] 1251
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
Determining that the acquiescence program was helpful to taxpayers and
to the IRS, the agency later extended the practice to federal district court
and courts of appeals cases.5 3 The modern acquiescence policy begins with
the preparation of "actions on decisions" by attorneys in the Tax Litigation
Division whenever the IRS loses a case in any federal court.1 4 An IRS
attorney prepares the action on decision at the same time that the attorney
drafts a formal recommendation to the Department of Justice as to whether
the Department should appeal a particular case.'55 An action on decision sets
forth the issue decided against the IRS and provides a brief synopsis of the
facts and reasoning supporting the attorney's suggestion that the Commis-
sioner either acquiesce or nonacquiesce. 5 6 If the action on decision is accepted
upon further agency review, the IRS publishes and distributes the document
to IRS field personnel. 57 The IRS publishes the bases for actions on decisions
regarding Tax Court cases in the Internal Revenue Bulletin as formal
acquiescences or nonacquiescences.5 8 The IRS, however, never publishes as
acquiescences or nonacquiescences actions on decisions concerning district
court, court of appeals, or Court of Claims decisions. 5 9 The IRS acquiescence
program, therefore, resembles the NLRB's nonacquiescence practice because
agency decisions whether to follow district court and court of appeals rulings
153. See J. QUIGGLE & L. REDMAN, supra note 8, at 44 (practice of reacting to tax decisions
started with Tax Court and IRS did not extend practice to other federal court cases until some
time later).
154. See Taxation With Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Serv., 646 F.2d 666, 672
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (actions on decisions are legal memoranda prepared by attorneys in IRS Tax
Litigation Division and directed to Chief Counsel whenever IRS loses case in Tax Court, federal
district court, Court of Claims, or United States court of appeals); M. SALzAN, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3.0414], at 77 (1981) (whenever IRS loses issue
in tax cases, either in Tax Court or in federal district court, lawyer in Chief Counsel's Tax
Litigation Division prepares action on decision).
155. See Taxation With Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Serv., 646 F.2d 666, 672




158. Id. at 672; see Note, supra note 1, at 550 (IRS periodically publishes acquiescences
and nonacquiescences to Tax Court decisions in Internal Revenue Bulletin); see also M.
SALTZMAN, supra note 154, 304(4), at 68 (frequently there is delay in issuance of acquiescence
or nonacquiescence after actions on decisions concerning Tax Court rulings).
159. See B. BITTKER, supra note 144, 110.5.6, at 50 (formal acquiescence/nonacquiescence
policy applies only to Tax Court decisions but IRS also announces whether agency accepts
decisions of federal district courts, courts of appeals, or Court of Claims as precedents for
disposition of similar cases); Note, supra note 1, at 550 (Commissioner never publishes
acquiescence or nonacquiescence in district court, court of appeals, or Court of Claims
decisions); see also J. QUIGGLE & L. REDMAN, supra note 8, at 44 (distinguishing between
acquiescences and nonacquiescences regarding Tax Court decisions published in Internal Revenue
Bulletins and unpublished actions on decisions issued for guidance of IRS personnel with regard
to decisions of other courts).
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are not labeled "nonacquiescence" and are not published.16 The IRS pro-
gram, however, also resembles the SSA's nonacquiescence policy insofar as
the IRS publishes acquiescences to most Tax Court opinions and the reasons
therefor much as the SSA publishes rulings of nonacquiescence regarding
federal court opinions .'6  Unlike the SSA, however, the IRS does not
encourage reliance on the published nonacquiescences.1
6 2
As have the SSA and the NLRB, the IRS has sought to justify its
nonacquiescence policy by emphasizing the nationwide applicability of the
act the agency must administer. 63 The IRS also has argued that the agency
must administer the act in a uniform manner.'6 More uniquely, the IRS has
presented the argument that the need for certainty in the body of law
administered by the agency justifies nonacquiescence.165 The IRS has stated
that certainty in tax law is highly desirable because consistent rules facilitate
the large amounts of business and tax planning normally predicated on IRS
interpretations of the tax acts.'6 Certainty, as it relates to parties' reliance
on agency actions, is not as important to the SSA as it is to the IRS, because
SSA claimants, unlike taxpayers, do not predicate future actions upon agency
nonacquiescences or interpretations. 67 Unlike the IRS, neither the SSA nor
160. Compare supra note 159 and accompanying text (in declining to accept federal court
decisions as precedent, IRS does not publish declination or formally label policy "nonacquiesc-
ence") with Mattson, supra note 1, at 2563, 2565 (NLRB stamps judicial decision with which
agency disagrees "law of the case" and not "nonacquiescence" and publishes no guidelines or
rules regarding agency's decision).
161. Compare supra note 158 and accompanying text (IRS publishes bases for actions
taken on Tax Court opinions as "acquiescence" or "nonacquiescence") with SSR 82-49c (1982);
SSR 82-10c (1982); SSR 81-12c (1981); SSR 81-28c (1981) (SSA rulings that agency labeled
"nonacquiescence" and which state bases for agency's disagreement with federal court).
162. Compare supra note 152 (IRS limits extent to which taxpayers should rely on
acquiescence program) with SSR 82-49c (1982) and SSR 82-10c (1982) (stating SSA position
that will govern all future cases dealing with relevant section of Social Security Act). One
commentator has noted that the IRS does not invite taxpayer reliance on notices of acquiescence
or nonacquiescence in the same manner that the agency encourages reliance on published revenue
rulings. B. BrraKER, supra note 144, at 110.5.6, at 50. Rarely does an acquiescence prevent
the IRS from collecting a tax otherwise due or from litigating the issue decided on the issue's
merits in a later and similar case. Id.
163. See Note, supra note 1, at 555 & n.24 (IRS spokesmen have argued consistently that
nationwide uniformity of tax structure is essential and justifies acquiescence program and
continued litigation).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 556 & n.28 (IRS argues that need for certainty in tax law justifies
nonacquiescence and relitigation).
166. See id. (certainty is very important in tax law because consistent rules facilitate
business and tax planning).
167. See Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, No. 84-0124 (D.D.C. Sept. 10,
1984) (available Feb. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (SSA naming uniformity
as reason for nonacquiescence policy but not citing certainty as justification); H.R. REP. No.
618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984) (noting that SSA defends nonacquiescence policy on grounds
of need for uniformity but does not mention certainty).
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the NLRB has stressed the need for certainty in a body of law as a
justification for nonacquiescence.
6s
Judicial reaction to IRS nonacquiescence has been far less adverse than
the courts' response to NLRB and SSA nonacquiescence policies. 69 The
courts have recognized that the Commissioner either may acquiesce or
nonacquiesce in Tax Court opinions and that Tax Court decisions do not
bind the agency. 70 Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
IRS can withdraw a published acquiescence in a Tax Court decision and
substitute a nonacquiescence having retroactive effect.' 7' Because the IRS
nonacquiesces to federal district and circuit court opinions much more rarely
than the SSA and the NLRB 7 2 and because the nonacquiescence is apparently
only intercircuit in nature, 7 1 judicial statements regarding the policy are
scarce. Courts facing the IRS relitigation policy appear unconcerned with
the practice, as evidenced by the courts' failure to address the propriety of
the relitigation in case opinions. 174
Although the courts have criticized only SSA and NLRB nonacquiesc-
ence, other authorities have disparaged the practices of all three agencies. 17
168. See Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957) (stressing need for
uniform interpretation of National Labor Relations Act but not giving need for certainty as
justification for nonacquiescence); Ferguson, supra note I, at 206-11 (noting NLRB's reliance
on theories of uniformity and agency expertise to support nonacquiescence but that agency has
not mentioned certainty as ground for NLRB justification of policy).
169. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (judicial reaction to IRS nonacquiesc-
ence).
170. See Snyder v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 196, 198-99 (D. Md. 1984) (Commissioner
may either acquiesce or nonacquiesce in Tax Court decision); id. at 199 (Tax Court rulings are
not binding precedent that IRS must follow blindly in handling every later similar case); see
also Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 75 n.8 (acknowledging IRS practice of publishing
acquiescences and nonacquiescences and not commenting adversely on practice).
171. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1964); see Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d
617, 623 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that Commissioner's acquiescence in case does not prevent
government from collecting tax in contravention of rule stated in case).
172. See B. BrrrKaR, supra note 144, 110.5.6, at 50 (IRS announces acceptances or
rejections of federal district and circuit court decisions much more rarely than agency states
acquiescences and nonacquiescences to Tax Court decisions).
173. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 n.12 (9th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing SSA
nonacquiescence policy from IRS practice on basis that IRS nonacquiescence rulings are
inapplicable within circuit that rendered opinion in which agency nonacquiesced); Chee v.
Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1983) (refuting SSA's -reliance on IRS nonac-
quiescence for support of SSA's policy by finding that ordinary effect of agency's nonacquiesc-
ence is intercircuit).
174. See Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (considering issue on
which five other circuit courts had rejected IRS's position but not commenting adversely on
IRS practice); Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230, 1232 (8th Cir. 1974)
(addressing IRS contention that many federal court opinions ruling against IRS position were
"ill-considered," but not criticizing IRS relitigation); cf. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Williamson,
549 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1977) (Lay, J., concurring) (criticizing Postal Service's relitigation
strategy of forum shopping).
175. See H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 26 (1984) (House committee recognizes
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Commentators discussing each of the agencies' policies have stated that
nonacquiescence undermines the structure of federal law and improperly
places the agency above the federal courts.1 76 Additionally, commentators,
courts, and Congress have rejected the agencies' arguments that nonacquiesc-
ence promotes uniform interpretation of national acts. 77 These authorities
have countered the agencies' uniformity arguments by asserting that nonac-
quiescence creates a prejudicial duality whereby poorer litigants who are
unable to afford the steps necessary to exhaust administrative remedies never
receive review under the standard articulated by the federal courts. 7 1 Au-
thorities addressing NLRB and SSA policies also have assailed the agencies'
arguments that agency expertise mandates judicial deference to agency sta-
tutory interpretations. 79 One commentator has suggested that once a court
no reason for allowing SSA to ignore circuit courts' determinations of law simply because
agency believes courts' view is incorrect); Ferguson, supra note 1, at 216-18 (refuting NLRB's
rationale for using nonacquiescence policy); Heaney, supra note 63, at 9 (SSA's policy of
nonacquiescence is unacceptable); Mattson, supra note 1, at 2562-67 (NLRB's use of nonac-
quiescence policy is arbitrary, prejudicial, wasteful of resources, has no basis in law and is
outside grant of agency's statutory authority); Note, Treasury Department's Practice of Non-
acquiescence to Court Decisions, 28 ALB. L. Rav. 274, 280 (1964) (Commissioner of IRS abuses
administrative discretion in applying nonacquiescence policy) [hereinafter cited as Treasury
Department's Practice]; Note, supra note 1, at 553 (IRS nonacquiescence destroys uniformity
and makes taxation regressive). But see Zimmerman, Restoring Stability in the Implementation
of the National Labor Relations Act, 1 LAB. LAW. 1, 2-6 (1985) (defending NLRB's nonac-
quiescence policy).
176. See H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984) (outside experts have criticized
SSA's nonacquiescence on grounds that policy undermines structure of federal law and essentially
allows agency to overrule federal courts' judgments by administrative inaction); Mattson, supra
note 1, at 2561 (by nonacquiescing NLRB places itself above circuit courts appointed by statute
to review NLRB decisions); Treasury Department's Practice, supra note 17, at 278 (IRS
nonacquiescence actually places Commissioner above any court in land).
177. See H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1984) (rather than promoting
uniformity, nonacquiescence creates prejudicial duality between claimants who can afford to
litigate up to courts and poorer claimants whose benefits SSA revokes under agency standard);
Ferguson, supra note 1, at 216-17 (nonacquiescence creates and encourages national labor policy
that establishes one set of rules for litigants with sufficient resources to reach courts for review
of NLRB order and different rules for litigants who cannot afford review); Note, supra note 1,
at 553 (nonacquiescence destroys uniformity because similarly situated taxpayers are treated
differently based on dollar amount of tax claim). One commentator has stated that in addition
to creating nonuniformity, NLRB nonacquiescence creates a special hardship for parties charging
commission of an unfair labor practice because courts cannot review an NLRB decision not to
issue a complaint. Mattson, supra note 1, at 2562.
178. See supra note 177 (authorities stating nonacquiescence destroys uniformity).
179. See, e.g., Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1981) (reviewing
courts need not rubber-stamp affirmance of agency decisions that courts determine are incon-
sistent with statutory mandate); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980)
(although courts should grant some deference to agency's interpretation of statute agency
administers, courts retain final authority on matters of statutory interpretation); Mayburg v.
Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 922, 929 (D. Mass. 1983) (interpretation of Social Security Act is judicial
function and courts need not defer to agency position), aff'd sub nom., Mayburg v. Secretary
of HHS, 740 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1984); H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1984)
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disagrees with an agency's interpretation of the relevant statute, expertise
can not justify agency refusal to adhere to the court's decision. 180 The writer
commented further that agency expertise does not divest the reviewing court
of the authority to pronounce a binding rule of law.18'
If nonacquiescence is justified at all, of the three major agencies utilizing
the policy, the IRS' use of the practice is the most acceptable.8 2 Unlike the
NLRB and the SSA, which practice intracircuit nonacquiescence, the IRS
utilizes only intercircuit nonacquiescence or relitigation 83 Regardless of
which agency utilizes the practice, intercircuit nonacquiescence is probably
an acceptable process despite the litigational costs involved. 8 4 Relitigation
creates circuit conflict that helps define controverted issues for the Supreme
Court and acts as the catalyst for Supreme Court review.'85 Moreover,
because one circuit's opinion is not binding within other circuits, intercircuit
nonacquiescence does not violate the doctrine of stare decisis as intracircuit
nonacquiescence does.1
8 6
In addition to utilizing only intercircuit nonacquiescence, the IRS differs
from the NLRB and the SSA in the IRS' relation to the public. 8 7 To a
greater degree than the NLRB and the SSA, the IRS receives constant
requests for private rulings that shape the future actions of significantly
(there is no reason why Congress should consider SSA's statutory interpretation superior to
court's construction, especially when statute is vague or silent on issue concerned).
180. Ferguson, supra note 1, at 217.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (courts are not as opposed to IRS
nonacquiescence as to NLRB and SSA nonacquiescence); infra notes 183-200 and accompanying
text (discussing relative acceptability of nonacquiescence policies of SSA, NLRB, and IRS).
183. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 n.12 (9th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing SSA
intracircuit nonacquiescence policy from IRS policy on ground that IRS practices only intercircuit
nonacquiescence); vacated, 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362,
1365 (D. Ariz. 1983) (implying IRS nonacquiescence policy is only intercircuit).
184. See Zimmerman, supra note 175, at 4-5 (NLRB intercircuit nonacquiescence is
necessary and beneficial); infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of
intercircuit nonacquiescence). But see Vestal, supra note 3, at 127, 178 (relitigation wastes legal
resources and causes inequality in application of law to extent that outweighs benefits policy
achieves).
185. See United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(agency's attempt to seek conflict in circuits on point of law is acceptable course of action in
view of Supreme Court policy of granting writs of certiorari to resolve circuit conflicts).
186. See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover, 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900) (one circuit court's opinion
is not binding on another circuit court); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 n.12 (9th Cir.
1984) (agencies can not be expected always to give nationwide effect to holdings of court of
appeals because conflicts among circuits are inevitable), vacated 53 U.S.L.W. 3435 (1984);
Frock v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 685 F.2d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1982) (unappealed
circuit court decision does not have effect of setting nationwide standard).
187. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (greater number of persons rely on IRS




more members of the public.'88 Because of the ability of taxpayers to rely
on over ninety percent of IRS acquiescences, s9 the program has served as
an additional planning aid that helps to alleviate the burden of private
rulings.'19 The practice has survived since 1932 as an indicator of IRS
litigation plans and aid to prospective transactions. 9 Furthermore, the courts
have not criticized the policy as they have disparaged NLRB and SSA
nonacquiescence. 192
Although the lower federal courts have not responded favorably to
NLRB nonacquiescence, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has com-
mented adversely on the NLRB's practice. 93 The House of Representatives,
however, has criticized the SSA's nonacquiescence. 94 Moreover, the NLRB
has more reason to utilize intracircuit nonacquiescence than the SSA. 195
Under the NLRA, a litigant can petition for review of a NLRB order and
the NLRB can petition for enforcement of an agency order in as many as
four circuits. 96 When deciding a case, therefore, the NLRB may not know
which circuit's legal interpretation to apply when there is a conflict in the
circuits' law. 97 Even commentators who are adverse to the NLRB's nonac-
quiesce policy admit that legislative action would be necessary to eliminate
the dilemma of multiple circuits of review. 9 Conversely, the Social Security
188. See Treasury Department's Practice, supra note 175, at 279 (IRS is in unique position
of agency with tremendous impact upon public); see also A. SANTA BARBARA, supra note 145,
at 44-61 (detailing IRS's private ruling program).
189. See Note, supra note 1, at 552 & n.13 (IRS has withdrawn acquiescences at only 6.5 %
of rate of issuance and nonacquiescences at 29% of rate of issuance).
190. See Rogovin, supra note 14, at 772 (IRS acquiescence/nonacquiescence program serves
as additional aid to taxpayers in planning prospective transactions); see also A. SANTA BARBARA,
supra note 145, at 96 (Commissioner's acquiescence or nonacquiescence provides guide in
predicting IRS's actions in similar cases).
191. See Rogovin, supra note 14, at 77-72.
192. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (courts' response to IRS nonacquiesc-
ence has not been as negative as courts' reaction to NLRB and SSA nonacquiescence).
193. See Zimmerman, supra note 175, at 3 (in nearly 50 years, neither Congress nor
Supreme Court has commented adversely on NLRB's justification for nonacquiescence).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1984) (SSA nonacquiescence
creates duality and SSA should cease use of policy).
195. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (potential for uncertainty as to which
circuits' law to apply in deciding issue distinguishes NLRB nonacquiescence from SSA nonac-
quiescence).
196. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982) (NLRB may petition court of appeals for enforcement
of agency order in circuit where unfair labor practice in question occurred, where person resides,
or where person transacts business); id. § 160(0 (any person aggrieved by final NLRB order
may obtain judicial review of order in circuit where unfair labor practice allegedly occurred,
where person resides, where person transacts business, or in United States Court of Appeals
for District of Columbia).
197. See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 218-19 (NLRB can not know in advance of agency's
decision which circuit might later review particular case).
198. Id. at 218-20.
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Act provides for only one possible circuit to which a litigant may appeal.'1
The SSA, therefore, is not as justified as the NLRB in utilizing intracircuit
nonacquiescence.
2°°
The SSA, the NLRB, and the IRS all employ policies of disregarding
judicial decisions that fall within the definition of agency nonacquiescence. 20'
Each agency's policy, however, has a different genesis and each agency
implements nonacquiescence in a different manner.2 2 Moreover, each agency
stands in a different relation to the public and to the courts and each agency
employs different types of nonacquiescence. 203 All agency actions termed
nonacquiescence, therefore, cannot be dismissed automatically as improper,
unlawful, or unjustified. Consequently, any solutions proposed to solve




199. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(g) (1982 & Supp. 1984) (any party may obtain judicial review of
final decision of Secretary in district court within district where party resides or does business).
200. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (appeal from NLRB decision lies in as
many as four judicial circuits whereas party may appeal from SSA decision usually in only one
circuit); see also Frock v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 685 F.2d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir.
1982)(noting that because petitioners could appeal Board decisions in any of three circuits Board
had no way of determining which circuit would ultimately review agency's decision in particular
case); id. (nature of Board's jurisdictional grant distinguishes Board from SSA).
201. See supra notes 17-30 and 43-52 and accompanying text (discussing implementation
of SSA nonacquiescence policy); supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text (discussing present
usage of NLRB nonacquiescence); supra notes 153-61 (detailing operation of current IRS
nonacquiescence program).
202. See supra notes 17-30 and 43-52 and accompanying text (providing examples of
implementation of SSA nonacquiescence through Social Security Rulings, memoranda to agency
administrative law judges, and unstated practice of nonadherence to precedent); supra notes
100-08 and 110-16 and accompanying text (demonstrating that origin of NLRB nonacqiescence
is somewhat unclear and discussing agency's rather tacit nonacquiescence policy); supra notes
147-62 and accompanying text (discussing history of IRS acquiescence program and current IRS
practice of publishing nonacquiescences to Tax Court decisions but not to district and circuit
court decisions).
203. See supra notes 85-87, 167, and 199 and accompanying text (stating that SSA
nonacquiescence differs from IRS nonacquiescence in that SSA policy is intracircuit, SSA has
less impact on public than IRS, and SSA knows which circuit law will apply if claimant appeals
particular case currently under SSA consideration); supra notes 101, 188, and 196-98 and
accompanying text (noting that NLRB has less impact on public than IRS, practices intercircuit
as well as intracircuit nonacquiescence, and can encounter judicial review of NLRB decisions
in any one of as many as four circuits); supra notes 169-74, 183, 188-91 and accompanying text
(stating that judicial reaction to IRS nonacquiescence has been far less adverse than courts'
response to SSA and NLRB policies, IRS practices only intercircuit nonacquiescence, and IRS
has greater impact upon public than SSA or NLRB).
204. See H.R. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 38 (1984) (expressing congressional
intent that rather than nonacquiescing Secretary either should promptly appeal to Supreme
Court or seek legislative resolution from Congress); Ferguson, supra note 1, at 220-23 (proposing
alternative to NLRB nonacquiescence policy); Note, supra note 1, at 557 (proposing set of rules
to supplant IRS nonacquiescence).
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